We document some key facts about aggregate consumption and its subcomponents over time. We then document the behavior of some important determinants of consumption, such as consumers' expectations about their future income, and changes in the consumers' wealth positions. Finally, we use a simple permanent income model to show that the observed drop in consumption during the Great Recession can be explained by the observed drops in wealth and income expectations.
Introduction
The Great Recession of 2008/2009 was characterized by the most severe year over year decline in consumption since 1945. The consumption slump was both deep and long lived. It took almost 12 quarters for total real Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) to go back to its level at the previous peak (2007:Q4).
This article documents key facts about aggregate consumption and its subcomponents over time and looks at the behavior of important determinants of consumption, such as consumers' expectations about their future income, and changes in the consumers' wealth positions due to changes in house prices and stock valuation. Then, the article uses a simple permanent income model to determine whether the observed drop in consumption can be explained by the observed drops in wealth and income expectations.
The data analysis starts by using macroeconomic data to study the behavior of consumption and its subcomponents. The analysis then turns to microeconomic data from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers to study nominal expected income growth and inflationary expectations.
Our main findings from the Macro data are the following. First, the Great Recession marked the most severe and persistent decline in aggregate consumption since WWII. All subcomponents of consumption declined during this period. However, the large drop in services consumption stands out most compared to previous recessions. Second, while the decline was historic, the time path of consumption and its subcomponents leading up the recession was not substantially different from past recessionary periods. Third, the recovery path of consumption following the Great Recession has been uncharacteristically weak. It took nearly three years for total consumption to return to its level just prior to the recession. In contrast, the second worst rebound observed in the data followed the 1974 recession and lasted just over one year. We find that this persistence is reflected most in the subcomponents of non-durables and especially services consumption.
Our main findings from the analysis of the Micro data are as follows. First, expected nominal income growth declined significantly during the Great Recession. It is the worst drop ever observed in these data, and it has not yet fully recovered to pre-recession levels. Second, 3 the decline exists for all age groups, education levels, and income quintiles. Relative to previous recessions, however, those with higher levels of income and education are more pessimistic than their poorer and less educated counterparts. Third, expectations for real income growth have also declined, and the decline in expected real income growth is more severe when personal inflation expectations are used instead of actual CPI inflation. Fourth, expected income growth is a strong predictor of actual future income growth. Since expected income growth is a very important determinant of consumption decisions, the observed drop in expected income has the potential to explain at least part of the observed decline in consumption.
In the context of a simple permanent income model, we find that the negative wealth effect (coming from decreased stock market valuation and housing prices) and decreased consumers' income expectations were big factors in determining the observed consumption drop. In fact, we find that in this model the observed drops in wealth and income expectations can explain the observed drop in consumption in its entirety, depending on what is assumed about future income growth going forward, beyond the time horizon covered by the Michigan Survey of Consumers data set. 1963:Q4 1965:Q3 1967:Q2 1969:Q1 1970:Q4 1972:Q3 1974:Q2 1976:Q1 1977:Q4 1979:Q3 1981:Q2 1983:Q1 1984:Q4 1986:Q3 1988:Q2 1990:Q1 1991:Q4 1993:Q3 1995:Q2 1997:Q1 1998 All sub-components of PCE fell during the Great Recession. Durables growth was somewhat weaker than in the previous five recessionary periods, both in terms of average growth rate and pattern of recovery. However, non-durables, and especially services, were the sub-components that were most depressed compared to the previous recessions. In all other recessions PCE services grew both before and after the peak, while during the last recession, it stagnated starting 2 quarters after the peak (four quarters before the trough) and kept stagnating for four additional quarters afterwards. It took until Q4 2010 to return to peak levels. Regarding the main services subcomponents, Petev, Pistaferri, and Ecksten (2010) document that spending on health services increased, held stable for housing and utilities, but declined substantially for services related to transportation, food and recreation. In sum, the most adjustable services dropped, while those that the consumer has little flexibility about, did not.
Macro data: total real PCE
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We can see from figure 6 that the rise in PCE non-durables was similar to most other recessions before the peak, but was among the worst of the recovery paths. home production. Including childcare, that fraction of time is 35%. This is an important channel that could produce more goods (such as food) and services (such as childcare) at a lower cost.
More work is needed to determine if home production could completely explain the observed decline in food spending.
Total real PCE durables
Figure 7 displays a large drop for durables over the most recent recession. Five to six quarters after the peak, this recession actually displayed the largest drop in durables, compared to the previous five recessions, and while durable then started recovering, the speed of recovery was low, as it took 12 quarters to go back to the previous peak level. To summarize, our main findings from the macro data are as follows. First, the Great Recession marked the most severe and persistent decline in aggregate consumption since WWII. All subcomponents of consumption declined during this period. However, we find that the significant drop in consumed services stands out most compared to previous recessions.
Second, while the decline was historic, the time path of consumption and its subcomponents leading up the recession was not substantially different from past recessionary periods. Third, the recovery path of consumption following the Great Recession has been uncharacteristically weak. It took nearly three years for total consumption to return to its level just prior to the recession. In contrast, the second worst rebound observed in the data followed the 1974 recession and was just over one year. We find that this persistence is reflected most in the subcomponents of non-durables and especially services consumption.
The Micro evidence: expected income in the Michigan Survey of Consumers
This section documents consumer expectations for future income, both in nominal and real terms, to see whether shocks to permanent income are contributing to the consumption dip.
The survey asks two questions to identify the magnitude and sign of the income change.
i) "During the next 12 months, do you expect your income to be higher or lower than during the past year?"
ii)
"By about what percent do you expect your income to (increase/decrease) during the next 12 months?"
The resulting index of expected income growth ranges between +95 and -95 in the crosssection and reflects the expected percent change in nominal income in the next year. The historical mean is +5.5%, split between +4.8% during recessions and +5.6% during expansions. This number is historically very similar to realized CPI inflation. We construct expected real income growth by subtracting each individual's inflation expectations from his expected nominal income growth.
We construct time series from the micro data. For each month of the survey we take crosssectional means within each demographic group addressed below, and then aggregate to quarterly frequency to minimize noise. The data begin in 1978 and go through the first half of 2011, though some series only go back to 1990. Thus, we typically have 5 recession periods to examine. 
Nominal income growth expectations
Except for the Great Recession and the 1980 recession, income expectations show a downward trend for up to four quarters around the NBER peak, but then stabilize and actually rise by the end of our 4 year window (see figure 9 ). For both the 1980 and most recent recession, we observe larger and more prolonged dips. Besides the abnormal drop, both in terms of size and duration, the recovery periods also stand out for their length and sluggishness. Even well after 10 quarters from the peak, expected nominal income growth was still well below the pre-recessionary periods. In terms of levels, it should be noted that the most recent recession is the only one during which nominal income expectations reached negative growth rates. Along all of the previous recessions that we study, even when nominal income growth rates go down, they stay well above 4%. Of course, inflation has been lower during the most recent recession. We will discuss real income patterns later. In the most recent recession, the 1st quintile (the poorest) dropped the least. By the end of 2010 all income levels have roughly converged to the same post-peak level and are much closer together. This is consistent with Petev, Pistaferri, and Ecksten's findings. First, they find that increased government transfers propped up income among the poorest-income households during the Great recession. Second, using the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment, they document that high income people have become more pessimistic than other groups during 15 the Great Recession. 2 Finally, using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), they find that respondents in the top decile of the wealth distribution are the ones who decrease spending during the Great Recession (-5.4%). This finding holds for the subcategories of nondurables and services. This drop in consumption might be due to the large negative wealth effect experienced by these households due to the decrease in house values and stock market valuation. Figure 11 . Expected nominal income growth by income quintile.
2 As a possible explanation for the pessimism of the wealthy, Shapiro (2010) finds that these household were exposed more to the stock market and experienced larger declines in wealth as a consequence. The median decline in wealth was 15% in Shapiro's data, and those who lost at least 10% of their net worth had almost twice the mean wealth and 3.5 times the median wealth of the sample. 
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Real income growth expectations.
Nominal income growth during the Great Recession was low, but inflation was also low.
To study the behavior of real income expectations, we measure inflation in two ways. First, we use actual CPI inflation over the 12 month period covered by the survey question, which assumes that consumers have perfect foresight over the next year concerning inflation. Second, we use the answer to the survey question about the individual's expectation about growth in prices over the next 12 months. Using these two measures, we construct individual-level expected real income growth and then aggregate up to population-quarter means.
The two inflation series have diverged in the past, but after the late 70s the differences are minor. At the start of the Great Recession, however, a large gap opened up, which makes for the largest discrepancy between these two data series. The swing in 2008 Q2 is +6% in expected inflation, compared to -1% actual CPI inflation. The two measures have since become closer together (see figure 13 ). The gap in these two measures of course impacts measured real income growth expectations as we document below. In figure 14 there is no clear cyclical pattern prior to the Great Recession in real income expectations. Before the most recent recession, real income growth was rather flat, dropped into negative territory several quarters before the peak, but then went up to about 4% four quarters after the peak. From then on, however, it had a large drop, reaching -3% five quarters after the peak. In summary, real income growth expectations deflated by CPI show a deterioration and lower average growth than during previous recessions. Figure 14 . Expected real income growth, CPI inflation. Figure 15 shows that perceived consumers' real income growth using the consumers' inflation expectactions provides a much more pessimistic outlook about consumers' purchasing power during the Great Recession. Consumers' perceived real income growth dipped in and out of negative territory well before the recession started, and sustained a large drop starting four quarters before the peak. That drop brought expectations from almost +2% to -4% growth rate three quarters after the peak. It took two more quarters to go back up to a -2% growth rate expectation, but there has been stagnation ever since. The recession window in figure 15 ends in Q4 2011 at an expected real income growth of -2.5%. In 2011 the series has recorded values of -3.1%, -3.7%, and -2.9% for quarters 1 through 3, respectively. Figure 15 . Expected real income growth, using consumers' inflation expectations.
Our main findings from the analysis of the Micro data are as follows. First, expected nominal income growth declined significantly during the Great Recession. It is the worst drop ever observed in these data, and it has not recovered to pre-recession levels. Second, the decline exists for all age groups, education levels, and income quintiles. Relative to previous recessions, those with higher levels of income and education are more pessimistic than their poorer and less educated counterparts. Third, expectations for real income growth have also 
Does the Michigan Expectations data have predictive power for future income and consumption growth?
Below we show that the Michigan data have a great deal of forecasting power for both future disposable income and consumption growth. We estimate the regression for disposable income first: Expected income growth is also a good predictor of consumption growth. Table 1 also presents regressions using future consumption growth as the left hand side variable and lagged consumption growth and the Michigan expectations variable as the right hand side variables.
The consumption forecast for 2011:Q3 to 2012:Q3 is for 0.1% growth.
In short, the low expected income growth in the Michigan Consumer Survey data suggest that the US will experience low income and consumption growth over the next two years. Obviously, there are many things not in our models so the estimates should only be taken as suggestive evidence. However, the results are fairly robust to changes in model specification and adding a few other variables, such as the unemployment rate. A given, and given income expectations. To avoid the additional complication of dealing with uncertainty, we assume that individuals are certain of future income. However, we allow them to revise their perceived income process if they make a mistake.
The solution to the consumer's problem is:
3) The unit of time in this analysis is a quarter, although so far we have been discussing all calibrations at annualized rates. We convert annual growth rates to quarterly ones, using the formula (1/4) (1 ) 1 g + − when taking the quarterly growth rate for g. For dollar amounts, we divide by 4. After converting everything to quarterly rates, we use the above two equations to solve for β and r. Table 1 presents all variables at quarterly and annualized rates. At annualized rates, β = .97 and r=.060.This gives a quarterly MPC out of permanent income equal to Over the last 40 years annual population growth for those aged 16+ is 1.4%, which we define as p. We assume this rate of population growth continues on into the future. Income growth in the individual's decision problem is in per capita terms. We then account for aggregate growth at the end by adjusting up disposable income by 1.4% at an annual rate. Table 2 study the effects of the decline in asset prices. Net worth fell $9.746 trillion in real terms over this time period. Given a quarterly MPC of .0074, we predict a ($9.746 trillion)X(.0074)X4 = $.289 trillion fall in consumption, at an annualized rate.
29
The following lines in the table predict Once we calculate the loss in Y  under different income and interest rate scenarios, we use the model to calculate the resulting consumption loss. The consumption loss associated with income process 1 is $0.917 trillion, which is reasonably close to the observed consumption loss. This computation is sensitive to the time path of the interest rate as well. The baseline calibration yields a yearly interest rate of 6%. In the lower short term interest rate scenario we assume that over the first year the yearly interest rate is 3% and then reverts back to 6%. In this case, income is less heavily discounted, hence its present value is higher and the implied consumption drop is $710 billion rather than $917 billion. Unsurprisingly, the very pessimistic income expectation scenario considered in Income process 2, generates a huge consumption loss of $4.038 trillion, which is almost 4 times larger than the consumption shortfall we wish to explain.
Because our model predicts that consumption is linear in resources (assets and the present value of future income), we can add up losses from assets and income. Note that the predicted consumption decline given the asset fall plus the predicted decline given income process 1 of $1.206 trillion lines up almost exactly with what is in the data.
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Conclusions
This article documents key facts about aggregate consumption and its subcomponents and looks at the behavior of important determinants of consumption over the cycle, such as consumption is consumer's expectations about their future income, and changes in the consumers' wealth positions due to changes in house prices and stock valuation. We performed a simple computation to determine whether the observed drop in consumption can be explained by the observed drops in wealth and income expectations.
In the context of a simple permanent income model, we find that the negative wealth effect (coming from decreased stock market valuation and housing prices) and decreased consumer's income expectations were big factors in determining the observed consumption drop. In fact, we find that in this model the observed drops in wealth and income expectations can explain the observed drop in consumption in its entirety, depending on what is assumed about future income growth going forward, beyond the time horizon covered by the Michigan Survey of Consumers data set.
